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Abstract. Artificial neural networks have been successfully used for
many different classification tasks including malware detection and dis-
tinguishing between malicious and non-malicious programs. Although
artificial neural networks perform very well on these tasks, they are also
vulnerable to adversarial examples. An adversarial example is a sam-
ple that has minor modifications made to it so that the neural network
misclassifies it. Many techniques have been proposed, both for crafting
adversarial examples and for hardening neural networks against them.
Most previous work has been done in the image domain. Some of the at-
tacks have been adopted to work in the malware domain which typically
deals with binary feature vectors. In order to better understand the space
of adversarial examples in malware classification, we study different ap-
proaches of crafting adversarial examples and defense techniques in the
malware domain and compare their effectiveness on multiple datasets.
Keywords: Adversarial machine learning ·Malware detection · Android
1 Introduction
Machine learning and deep neural networks in particular have been highly suc-
cessful in different applications. They can be used for image recognition with
human accuracy or above [1][2], and they have also been employed to perform
malware detection [3][4][5]. A problem with neural networks is that they have
been found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples created by perturbing input
data. Most adversarial machine learning research [6][7][8][9] focuses on images
since it is easy to visualize the perturbations, and all changes made to an image
still produce a valid image. When perturbing malware instead of images [10][11],
there are more constraints that need to be taken into consideration. This paper
investigates neural networks applied to malware classification. We focus on a
range of malware attacks and defenses proposed in recent years, providing an
overview of the algorithms and comparing their efficacy in a consistent manner.
With an increasing number of attacks and defenses available, it is non-trivial to
compare their effectiveness. Most publications use different datasets and different
model architectures which makes it even harder to compare different approaches.
Currently there is no straightforward way of telling which defense is efficient
against which attack and vice versa. In this paper, we compare twelve attacks,
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their effectiveness against undefended models, and the impact of four proposed
defenses. To achieve this, we use two different datasets from the malware do-
main and train deep neural networks on both. We implement or use existing
implementations of the attacks and defenses to gain a better understanding of
which defenses are strong in the malware domain. Our results show that all de-
fenses, except for adversarial training, perform worse on malware than they do
on images.
2 Background
2.1 Threat Model
In a malware detection setting, the system’s goal is to accurately distinguish
between malware and non-malware. The attacker in this case is the author of a
malicious program, and their goal is to evade detection by the malware dection
system. In order to evade the detection system the attacker has two options.
The first option is to “sabotage” the classifier to the point that it becomes
untrustworthy; the second is to modify their software is such a way that the
classifier views it as benign. It is possible that the target of an attacker is to
have a benign sample classified as malicious but it is a less straightforward
attack like flooding the classifier with false-positives therefore eroding the users
trust in the system.
While neural networks bring advantages for malware detection, their use
leaves the system vulnerable to attacks that can be leveraged against neural
networks in general. If an attacker can mislabel instances that are in the training
data it is called a data poisoning attack [12][13]. The goal of data poisoning is
to evade the classifier by having it trained on mislabeled data. In this paper, we
consider a less powerful attacker who can only interact with the system after it
has been trained and has no influence over the training data. All that they can
do is present an instance to the detection system and receive the classification
result. For most methods of creating adversarial examples, the attacker needs
access to the internal structure and information of the model. But even if the
attacker only has query access to the system, attacks are still possible. Papernot
et al. [14] have shown that any black box attack can be transformed into a
semi white box attack. This is due to transferability. It has been shown that
adversarial examples created on one model can also be used to attack another
model as long as the models have learned a similar enough decision boundary.
For this reason, attacks in this paper are all white box attacks.
2.2 Adversarial Examples
First described by Szedgy et al. [15] adversarial examples are instances that are
very close to a legitimate instance but are classified differently. Give an instance
x with the class label C(x) = t one can find an instance x′ such that C(x′) 6= t.
An additional constraint is that some distance metric ||x − x′|| should be kept
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small. This means the changes made to the legitimate sample should be as small
as possible. In images that usually means that it is impossible for a human
to perceive the changes between x and x′ with the naked eye. Different norms
including L0 norm [16] [17], L1 norm [18], L2 norm [17], and L∞ [19] have been
used. Since we are working with binary feature indication vectors, feature values
can either be 0 or 1. Therefore the L∞ norm would always be 1 if at least one
change was made. The ||x − x′||0 norm yields all the changes that have been
made. This makes L0 a good choice.
3 Experiments
3.1 Data
We use the Drebin dataset [20] of Android apps. It contains the extracted features
for both the malware and the benign class. Additionally it also contains the 5560
malware apps themselves. Drebin relies on static features, i.e., those that can be
extracted from an app without executing it. The specific features are: requested
hardware, requested permissions, app components, filtered intents, restricted
API calls, used permissions, suspicious API calls and network addresses. Those
features come either from the manifest or decompiling the code.
We also run experiments on another dataset APDS, which consists of per-
missions extracted from android apps. The data is available on kaggle [21]. It
contains 398 instances with 330 features. 50% of the samples are malware and
50% are benign.
3.2 The victim model
To test the performance of different attacks and defenses we define a victim
model. The model we use consist of four fully connected hidden layers with
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) as activation function. The architecture of the
victim model can be found in Table 2. The input layer is omitted since it depends
on the dataset. We trained the model for 100 epochs using the Adam optimizer
with a learning rate of .001, β1 = .9, β2 = .999. As a loss function binary cross
entropy is used. The performance of the victim model can be found in Table 1.
For all of our training, we use 56.25% of the data as training data, 18.75% as
validation data and 25% as test data.
Table 1: Accuracy (acc) of the victim model on the testset. Also the false nega-
tives rate (FNR), false positives rate (FPR), true positives rate (FPR) and true
negatives rate (TNR)
Dataset acc FNR FPR TPR TNR
Drebin500 0.99 0.10 0.01 0.89 0.99
APDS 0.98 0.04 0.0 0.96 1.0
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Table 2: Architecture of the victim model
Layer Neurons activation function
Fully connected 300 ReLU
Fully connected 250 ReLU
Fully connected 200 ReLU
Fully connected 128 ReLU
Fully connected 2 softmax
3.3 Feature Selection
The Drebin dataset is composed of features for over 120,000 instances of which
roughly 5,500 are malware. Each instance has approximately 550,000 features.
The size of the instances makes the dataset unwieldy to use, and building a neural
network graph with features that size leads to memory problems very quickly.
Grosse et al. [10] find that only a small number of features are used for creating
adversarial examples. In order to test more complex models without running
into memory problems, we employ feature selection on the victim model (Table
2). We use the scikit-learn [22] implementation of SelectKBest with chi-squared
as the scoring function and run feature selection for different values of K. The
accuracy on the benign class does not change much with the number of features.
This is due to the class imbalance. With 500 and 1000 features we achieve 99.6%
accuracy on the benign class and 89.2% on the malware class. Throughout the
paper, when we want to indicate that we have used feature selection, we will
indicate the number of features K that we have used as follows: DrebinK .
4 Attacks
4.1 JSMA
Grosse et al. [10] adapted the approach developed for images in [23] based on Ja-
cobian Saliency Maps (JSMA). The Jacobian matrix is the matrix of the forwards
derivatives for every feature of a sample wrt the output classes. The creation of
adversarial examples consists of two steps. First the Jacobian is calculated. In
the second step the feature with maximum positive gradient towards the desired
output class is selected and perpetuated. In order to guarantee a correctly func-
tioning adversarial example the constraint to only add features and not remove
any is added. The steps of calculating the Jacobian and changing a feature are
repeated multiple times, until a maximum number of allowed perturbations has
been made or misclassification is achieved. For a more in depth description see
Algorithm 1 in [10].
The JMSA attack is effective against our trained victim models (Table 3),
with evasion rates varying depending on the data set. While on APDS an evasion
rate of 100% can be achieved on the Drebin500 data we were only able to evade
the classifier 33% of the time. The change column gives the average changes
made to all adversarial examples.
Adversarial Examples and Defenses for Malware Classification 5
Table 3: Grosse et. al [10] approach based on JSMA with a maximum of 25
allowed perturbations.
Dataset acc acc adv FNR FNR adv # Features changed evasion
Drebin500 0.99 0.98 0.01 0.19 1.89 0.33
APDS 0.93 0.63 0.12 0.56 13.57 1.00
4.2 Feature enabling and disabling
Stokes et al. [24] propose different variants for creating adversarial examples, re-
laxing the constraints on allowed modifications. Instead of only adding features,
which preserves the functionality of the malware, the authors also allow for the
removal of features. The reasoning is that attackers can find different ways to
implement the same malicious behavior. While this might be true, it requires a
great deal of effort and is nowhere near as straightforward as only allowing the
addition of features. We include the methods for completeness.
Stokes et al. propose three iterative methods which are based on the Jacobian
using positive features and negative features. A positive feature is a feature that
is an indicator of malware, meaning that the Jacobian for the malware class with
respect to the input is positive for this feature. Similarly, a negative feature is an
indicator for the benign class. From these attributes. From these attributes, the
authors develop three different iterative methods for creating adversarial exam-
ples. For every iteration the Jacobian of the sample is calculated wrt. the output
classes and one feature is perpetuated. This is done until the maximum num-
ber of allowed perturbations is reached or the sample is misclassified. Iteratively
disabling positive features is called the dec pos attack, and disabling negative
features, inc neg. These approaches can be applied in alternating fashion to get
dec pos + inc neg. Instead of choosing the feature with the maximum value, a
random feature can be chosen. This leads to three more different techniques; ran-
domized dec pos, randomized inc neg and randomized dec pos + inc neg. Note
that inc neg is the same strategy as that described in [10]. We apply the attacks
to our victim model trained on Drebin500 the results can be seen in Table 4.
Table 4: [24] approaches, enabling and disabling features based on their Jacobian.
Numbers reported on Drebin500
Attack acc acc adv FNR FNR adv change evasion
dec pos 0.99 0.98 0.05 0.16 1.65 0.25
inc neg 0.99 0.98 0.05 0.19 1.89 0.32
dec pos inc neg 0.99 0.98 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.27
rand. dec pos 0.99 0.98 0.05 0.15 2.09 0.24
rand. inc neg 0.99 0.99 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.06
rand dec pos inc neg 0.99 0.99 0.05 0.12 0.23 0.18
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randomized inc neg achieves no additional evasions at all, suggesting that
randomly enabling features is not a good approach. The relative effectiveness of
the attacks is similar over all compared models. The notable difference is that on
Drebin500 inc neg achieves a higher evasion with only slightly increased average
change when compared to dec pos. On the other victim model, dec pos is able
to achieve the same evasion rate as inc neg although at a smaller change cost.
4.3 FGSM with rounding and Bit ascending
Huang et al. [25] propose four different approaches. The first two methods are
based on the Fast Gradient Sign Method. FGSM is a one step method of moving
the sample in the direction of the greatest loss. A more powerful variation of
the attack is multi step FGSMk where k is the number of iterations. To apply
this method to the discrete malware domain rounding is required. The authors
propose two different rounding schemes: deterministic rounding dFGSMk and
random rounding rFGSMk. A third method is introduced which visits multiple
promising vertices and explores the possible feature space more thoroughly. This
method is called multi-step Bit Gradient Ascent(BGAk). BGAk works by setting
a bit if the partial derivative of the loss is greater or equal to the l2 norm of
the loss gradient divided by
√
m. The reasoning of the authors is that those
features contribute more or equally to the l2 norm of the loss. Another method
introduced is multi-step Bit Coordinate Ascent BCAk. At every step the bit
that corresponds to the feature with the maximum partial derivative of the loss
is changed. The results of attacking the model trained on Drebin500 can be found
in Table 5.
Table 5: [25] approaches FGSMk, rFGSMk, dFGSMk, BGAk and BCAk.
Numbers reported on Drebin500
Attack acc acc adv FNR FNR adv change evasion
dFGSM
k 0.99 0.99 0.05 0.10 7.16 0.15
rFGSM
k 0.99 0.99 0.05 0.10 7.16 0.15
BGA
k 0.99 0.99 0.05 0.05 1.14 0.05
BCA
k 0.99 0.99 0.05 0.09 1.26 0.12
The iterative variants of FGSM produce the most effective adversarial ex-
amples when it comes to evasion. The rounding scheme employed matters little.
The same pattern holds true when we attack the other victim model. On the
APDS model both attacks achieve 100% evasion rate. BGAk fails to achieve
any significant evasion beyond the natural loss across all models, while BCAk
performs very different depending on the model. On Drebin500 BCA
k achieves
12% evasion rate which is almost 2.5 times the natural evasion rate of 5%. On
APDS the evasion rate achieved by the attack is 14% which is barely more than
the natural rate of 12%.
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4.4 MalGAN
Malgan is an attack introduced by Hu et al. [26]. In order to create adversarial
examples it uses Generative Adversarial Network (GAN [27]). The idea behind
GANs is to create data by training an artificial neural network. For our exper-
iment we use the architecture described by Hu et al. The Generator takes a
legitimate sample as input and a 10 dimensional noise vector. This gets fed into
a fully connected hidden layer with 256 units and ReLU activation. The hidden
layer is fully connected to the output layer which uses sigmoid as activation
function. The size of the output layer is the size of the inputs. After the last
layer the output is rounded, thereby transformed into a proper binary feature
representation and the constraint of only adding features is enforced. For the Dis-
criminator we use a simple network with one hidden layer, 256 neurons, ReLU
activation. The output layer consists of one neuron with sigmoid activation.
The generator and discriminator are trained for 100 epochs. Every epoch
the generated adversarial examples are tested against a black box detector. At
the end the generator with highest misclassification rate on the black box gets
used. For the black box detector a model with two hidden layers is used. The
first hidden layer has 256 and the second one has 128. Both use ReLU as the
activation and a dropout of 0.2 during training. The output layer has two neurons
and uses softmax activation. The black box is trained for 200 epochs using Adam
with a learning rate of .001, β1 = .9, β2 = .999. With this attack we achieve the
evasion rates in Table 6.
Table 6: Hu et. al [26] approach which uses a GAN to create adversarial examples
Dataset acc acc adv FNR FNR adv change evasion
Drebin500 0.99 0.99 0.05 0.03 227.46 0.0
APDS 0.93 0.70 0.12 0.43 163.90 0.77
Interestingly when attacking the Drebin500 victim model no evasion at all is
achieved. In fact the opposite happens, and all adversarial examples get classi-
fied correctly, improving model performance. On APDS the attack achieves an
evasion rate of 77%. The attack on the Drebin500 model could possibly be made
more effective by using a more complex Discriminator and/or Generator. Also
noteworthy is the high modification count. The original approach as presented
in [26] offers no way of controlling the modification count. It could be possible
to add a penalty to the loss of Generator that penalizes large modifications. An-
other potentially interesting idea to pursue is to use more stable GAN training
methods such as Wasserstein GANs [28] and Improved Wasserstein GANs [29].
This could lead to results with a higher evasion rate.
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4.5 Attack Effectiveness
The effectiveness of an attack can be measured by its ability to create adversarial
examples that evade the classifier. The previous experiments have shown that
not all attacks work equally well and the victim model that is being attacked
also influences the effectiveness. In Table 7 we summarize how well the different
attacks were able to evade the classifiers. There are a few interesting things to
note. First, the evasion rate for the Drebin500 model is lower for all attacks
expect BGAk and random inc neg. The natural evasion is still lower for the
Drebin500 model. BGA
k on Drebin500 achieves 0.0% increase in evasion. For
random inc neg the increase in evasion is 7.4% for Drebin500. This makes the
model trained on the Drebin500 dataset more resistant to adversarial examples
than the other models. One possible explanation is that we perform feature
selection on the data before training the model, leaving the adversarial examples
creation algorithms less to work with. Zhang et al. [4] investigate feature selection
as a possible defense against evasion attacks.
Table 7: Comparison of the different attacks effectiveness’ on all victim models
Attack evasion ( in % ) on: Drebin500 APDS
natural 5.6 11.7
dfgsm k 15.0 100.0
rfgsm k 15.0 100.0
bga k 5.6 11.7
bca k 12.7 13.7
JSMA 32.8 100.0
random inc neg 6.0 11.7
dec pos 25.4 100.0
inc neg 32.8 100.0
random dec pos 24.7 100.0
random dec pos inc neg 18.1 96.1
dec pos inc neg 27.0 100.0
malgan 0.0 77.1
5 Defenses
5.1 Distillation
Distillation was originally introduced as a technique to train smaller models. To
achieve this, the smaller model is trained with soft class labels which is the output
of the bigger model. Distillation as a defensive technique also trains a second
network with soft class labels, but in this case the two networks have the same
architecture. The idea is not to make the network smaller but to make it more
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resilient to adversarial examples by being able to generalize better. Papernot
et al. [30] propose the idea for the image classification domain, [10] and [24]
have investigate distillation as a possible defense against adversarial examples in
malware detection. In their experiments it did not perform as well on malware as
on images. Additionally choosing a temperature T that is too high will actually
hurt the performance of the model. We chose T=10 in accordance with the result
of [24]. As the table shows, distillation does not actually add any robustness
to the network. The impact on accuracy is almost negligible. The undefended
network achieves an accuracy of 93% while the distilled network manages an
accuracy of 91.6%. When training the Drebin500 model with distillation and
T=10 the model already has a 1.0 FPR, making evasion attacks superfluous.
This may be due to feature selection, the class imbalance, or a combination of
the two.
5.2 Adversarial Training
Szegedy et al. [15] propose a strategy called adversarial training. The idea is
that adding adversarial examples to the training data acts as regularization.
This improves the generalization capabilities of the model and therefore makes
it more resistant against adversarial examples. The idea has been picked up by
many different researchers and modified. Kurakin et al. [31] introduce a scalable
adversarial training framework based on mini batches. They also find that exam-
ples created with single step methods such as FGSM offer greater benefits than
iterative approaches. On the other hand, when using adversarial samples for ad-
versarial training Mossavi et al. [8] find that using DeepFool samples increases
robustness, whereas using FGSM samples could lead to decreases in robustness.
Trame`r et al. [32] find that models trained with adversarial training are more re-
sistant to white box attacks but, counter intuitively, are still vulnerable to black
box attacks. Multiple authors have looked at adversarial training as a defense
in the malware domain. [10] find that the amount of adversarial examples in-
troduced during training needs to be carefully controlled. In their experiments,
adding more than 100 adversarial examples during training left the network more
vulnerable. Al-Dujaili et al. [25] describe adversarial learning as a saddle point
problem. It relies on finding the parameters θ for a classifier that minimizes some
loss function L when assigning class labels y to inputs x taken from a dataset
D. Creating an adversarial examplexadv, on the other hand, is a maximization
problem. Given all binary representations S(x) ⊆ X of a malware example x
that still preserve the functionality of x. We are looking for S∗(x) ⊆ S(x) that
maximize the adversarial loss. To create an adversarial example we need to find x¯
for which the adversarial loss is maximal. Combining both the learning problem
and the adversarial loss gives us the equation for adversarial learning
θ∗ ∈ arg min
θ∈RP
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
x¯∈S(x)
L(θ, x¯, y)
]
(1)
The outer minimization problem can be solved by various different gradient
descent algorithms. The inner maximization problem, the maximization of the
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adversarial loss, can be solved by multiple methods. [25] propose four different
approaches, discussed earlier in the attacks section. Theoretically any method
to create adversarial examples can be used here. We use dFGSMk to create
adversarial examples. The results suggest that adversarial training is very effi-
cient at making the network more robust against adversarial examples. Another
possibly beneficial strategy is using adversarial examples from different attacks
during training.
5.3 Ensembles
A modification of the ensemble method is proposed by Trame`r et al. [32] a de-
fense called Ensemble Adversarial Training. As in normal adversarial training,
adversarial examples are included in the dataset. In Ensemble Adversarial Train-
ing, the adversarial examples come not only from the model being trained but
also from another pretrained model. This training technique enhances the de-
fense against black box attacks. The authors do not consider Adaptive Black-Box
attacks which use the output of the target model to enhance their attack. [24]
looked at ensemble learning to defend malware detectors. In our experiments we
train three different models and combine them into an ensemble. For ensembles
to work it is best to have models that behave differently. For that reason we have
chosen three very different architectures. The three architectures are as follows.
1. For our first model we have chosen a very wide but rather flat architecture.
It consists of two fully connected hidden layers with 1000 neurons each. 2. The
second model was designed to be the opposite of the first model a rather flat
but deeper architecture. It consists of eight hidden layers with 64 neurons each.
3. The third model is a rather small model with 2 hidden layers consisting of
256 neurons for the first one and 128 for the second. All models use ReLU as
activation function for all layers, except the last layer which uses softmax. To
force the models to be more different from each other we employ heavy dropout.
Both hidden layers have a dropout value of 0.5. We train all three models for 200
epochs using the Adam optimizer with our standard settings described earlier
in the paper. We test the robustness of the ensemble of networks with all of
our attacks. Compared to the victim model, the natural evasion of the ensem-
ble is better, but the ensemble does not add anything in terms of adversarial
robustness. The ensemble performs worse, when possible, when under attack.
This backs up Goodfellow et al. claims that ensemble is not a good defense.
A potential idea that could improve the resistance of ensembles in a black box
setting is having the different classifiers work on different features. Since binary
programs do not represent the feature for a machine learning classifier directly,
like images do for example, they need to be extracted first. There are different
ways of extracting the features from an application. The two main methods are
dynamic and static feature extraction. Dynamic feature extraction collects the
features from the application at running time while static extraction does not
execute the program and only performs analysis on the compiled code or other
available resources. Different models in the ensemble could use different features
to train on. This might improve the resilience and make it harder for an attacker
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to find features to modify. Although Rosenberg et. al [33] have devised an attack
that works with an ensemble of two classifieres where one classifier learns from
static and the other learns from the dynamic features.
5.4 Random Feature Nullification
To make the gradient harder for an attacker to compute, Wang et al. [34] in-
troduce a defense called random feature nullification. During training and clas-
sification a random set of features gets disabled. This is achieved by choosing
a binary vector Ipi and computing the Hadamard-Product of the instance xi
and the vector Ipi . The zeros in Ipi are uniformly distributed. The number of
zeroes and the distribution are hyperparameters that can be tuned. Increasing
the number of features that are nullified will hurt performance, and not disabling
enough will have no impact on the attacker’s ability to create adversarial exam-
ples. It is simple to see that with nullifying all features the input would be a
vector of all zeros, making meaningful predictions impossible. Disabling only a
very small subset of features, especially on high dimensional data, decreases the
chances of hitting features that are important for an attacker. [10] found that
they were only modifying 0.0004% of the features to mislead the classifier. The
results vary quite a lot, which is to be expected given the random nature of the
network. It is possible that averaging could make the model more robust. This
raises the question, though, of wheter averaging would hurt the robustness and
could be exploited by an attacker. In the end averaging over different runs is
analogous to having an ensemble of classifiers with averaged results. As shown
earlier an ensemble offers little to no improvement in adversarial robustness.
Table 8: Comparison of the different attacks effectiveness on all victim mod-
els. Reported is evasion (in %). Used defenses: undefended (undef.), Distillation
(Dist.), Random Feature Nullification (RFN), Adversarial Training (AT) and
Ensembles (Ens.)
Attack undef. Dist. RFN AT Ens.
natural 11.7 12.0 85.6 2.7 8.7
dfgsm k 100.0 100.0 13.7 7.8 100.0
rfgsm k 100.0 100.0 9.8 7.8 100.0
bga k 11.7 100.0 72.5 3.9 100.0
bca k 13.7 31.4 68.5 3.9 17.6
JSMA 100.0 100.0 100.0 27.5 100.0
random inc neg 11.7 13.7 3.9 3.9 15.7
dec pos 100.0 100.0 96.1 100.0 100.0
inc neg 100.0 100.0 100.0 27.5 100.0
random dec pos 100.0 100.0 86.3 100.0 100.0
random dec pos inc neg 96.1 90.2 51.0 25.5 98.0
dec pos inc neg 100.0 100.0 100.0 25.5 100.0
malgan 77.1 95.8 100.0 62.5 12.5
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6 Discussion
Comparing the different defenses paints a pretty bleak picture. A side by side
comparison can be seen in Table 8. Distillation has almost no positive impact on
adversarial robustness and effectively hurts it against certain attacks. Random
feature nullification could be potentially beneficial, as it increases the robustness
significantly, but in our experiments it also hurts the unattacked performance
considerably. While the ensemble proves to be helpful in improving natural eva-
sion, it does not protect against adversarial evasion. It is possible that having
classifiers in the ensemble, trained on different feature representations of the
instance, would make the system more robust. The only defense that provided
significant robustness is adversarial training. We use the saddle point formulation
presented in [24] and the results look promising. It improves robustness against
all attacks that adhere to our threat model. We also suggest a possible improve-
ment to training process that includes adversarial examples from more than
one attack, possibly hardening the classifier further against more attacks. The
problem with adversarial training is that it is most efficient against attacks that
have been used during the training. Therefore, it does not necessarily provide
robustness against new yet unknown attacks. Even if a defense does not impact
the performance of the classifier significantly, it might make it more vulnerable
to certain adversarial examples creation methods. This poses the question of
whether the defenses we employ today in fact make models more vulnerable to
future attacks.
A good defense should ideally be robust against unknown attacks. So far,
none of the defenses provide any mathematical hardness guarantees in the way
that encryption does in traditional security. There is no guarantee that would
make it impossible or at least computationally infeasible for an attacker to create
adversarial examples. Not only is the problem of adversarial examples unsolved
as shown in [17], defense performance also varies when applied to malware data.
This suggests that the defense needs to be adapted to the domain in some way.
All of the defenses compared in this paper are domain agnostic. Perhaps an
approach tailored more directly to binary data could improve resilience.
Furthermore, there is currently no special adaptation for binary data in ma-
chine learning and neural networks. In image classification, convolutional layers
have moved feature extraction into the network itself. In text processing, em-
bedding layers have done something similar. For binary data, however, no such
layers exist. Security could be taken into consideration in the design of such
layers for malware detection, as well as in feature extraction.
7 Related Work
Yuan et al. [35] have compiled a summary of available methods for creating
adversarial examples and defense mechanisms. Their work is not limited to mal-
ware detection but contains a section on applications to malware detection. They
provide an overview of the different approaches and the underlying algorithms
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but do not provide any numbers which would allow for a comparison based on
effectiveness. Carlini et al. [17] look closely at ten available defenses and show
that none of them are unbeatable. All attacks and defenses evaluated in that
paper are in the image domain. Rosenberg et al. [33] use recurrent neural net-
works (RNN) to do malware detection on dynamic features. The authors pair the
RNN with an deep neural network (DNN) to learn from the static features. Their
goal is to come up with an attack which evades a system that takes advantage
of different feature representations. The dynamic features that the RNN learns
from are call sequences. The attack on the static classifier works similarly to the
attacks described in this paper. The attack on the RNN is based on an attack
working on text data [36]. The paper also features a comparison of different RNN
architectures and the effectiveness of the attack on a given architecture. With
a simple RNN being the must vulnerable and BLSTM being the most robust.
An interesting discovery the authors make is that the transferability property of
adversarial examples, described in [15], also holds true for RNNs. Hu et al. [37]
also work on RNN based malware detection. They propose an attack to lever-
age against black box classifiers, training their own substitute RNN and using
a generative RNN to create adversarial examples. Chen et al. [38] develop an
approach to defend the classifier that relies on feature selection and ensembles.
Their feature selection technique is named SecCLS and the ensemble learning
technique is called SecENS. By combining both methods, the authors develop a
system called SecureDroid. In [11] Chen et al. propose a secure two phased learn-
ing system. During the offline learning phase a classifier is trained and during
the online detection phase suspicious false negatives are used in further training
the classifier. Yang et. al [39] propose feature evolution and confusion. These
techniques look at how different features evolve over different versions of mal-
ware and can be used to create new synthetic malware instances for a classifier
to be trained on.
8 Conclusion
We studied the space of adversarial examples in malware classification by eval-
uating twelve attacks and four defenses on different datasets. Our experiments
show that attacks work reliably and it is relatively easy and straightforward to
create adversarial examples. The defenses, on the other hand, are not as straight-
forward and might not always be suitable. The right choice of defense depends on
many different factors such as dataset, model architecture and more. Our results
show that most defense mechanisms adapted from image classification, with the
exception of adversarial training, are not efficient in the malware domain, and
there is a need for approaches tailored to binary data to ensure robustness of
the classifiers.
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